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Ease Over Accuracy
in Assessing Patent Settlements
A response to Herbert Hovenkamp, Mark Janis, and
Mark A. Lemley, Anticompetitive Settlement of Intellectual
Property Disputes, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1719 (2003).
Daniel A. Cranet
Settlement payments from patentee-plaintiffs to allegedly
infringing defendants in exchange for discontinuance of the al-
legedly infringing use have drawn much attention recently in
government and private antitrust litigation,' legal and eco-
nomic scholarship,2 and Congress.3 I have argued that such "re-
t Assistant Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Ye-
shiva University; J.D., University of Chicago; B.A., Wheaton College. Thanks
to Jerry Hausman and Thomas Cotter for helpful comments on an earlier
draft.
1. See, e.g., Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1304
(11th Cir. 2003) (rejecting the district court's ruling that payments from the
patentee to the alleged infringer in consideration of the alleged infringer's
agreement not to market the allegedly infringing product during the pendency
of the lawsuit were per se illegal under section 1 of the Sherman Act); In re
Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 261 F. Supp. 2d 188, 250-52
(E.D.N.Y. 2003) (rejecting the claim that "reverse payments" from the pat-
entee to the alleged infringer are per se illegal under section 1 of the Sherman
Act); see also Daniel A. Crane, Exit Payments in Settlement of Patent In-
fringement Lawsuits: Antitrust Rules and Economic Implications, 54 FLA. L.
REV. 747 (2002) (collecting and discussing cases); Scott P. Perlman & Jay S.
Brown, FTC Targets Patent Settlement Agreements: Recent Actions Illustrate
Permissible and Unlawful Deals, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 11, 2002, at C1 (summariz-
ing recent government enforcement actions).
2. See, e.g., Joseph F. Brodley & Maureen A. O'Rourke, Preliminary
Views: Patent Settlement Agreements, 16 ANTITRUST 53 (2002); Jeremy Bulow,
The Gaming of Pharmaceutical Patents, in 4 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE
ECONOMY (Adam B. Jaffe et al. eds., forthcoming 2004); Thomas F. Cotter, Re-
fining the "Presumptive Illegality" Approach to Settlements of Patent Disputes
Involving Reverse Payments: A Commentary on Hovenkamp, Janis & Lemley,
87 MINN. L. REV. 1789 (2003); Herbert Hovenkamp et al., Anticompetitive Set-
tlement of Intellectual Property Disputes, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1719 (2003); James
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verse payments" (also known as "exit payments" or "exclusion
payments") should not be accorded per se treatment under the
antitrust laws and should be approved so long as the patentee
has a strong ex ante likelihood of succeeding on the merits of
its infringement claim and thereby excluding the infringing use
from the market.4
In a recent article in the Minnesota Law Review's Sympo-
sium, The Interface Between Intellectual Property Law and An-
titrust Law, Herbert Hovenkamp, Mark Janis, and Mark Lem-
ley argued that exclusion payments should be presumptively
unlawful, subject to an opportunity for the infringement plain-
tiff to rebut the presumption "by showing both (1) that the ex
ante likelihood of prevailing in its infringement lawsuit is sig-
nificant, and (2) that the size of the payment is no more than
the expected value of litigation and collateral costs attending
the lawsuit."5 The authors' proposed test is significantly more
restrictive than the test I have proposed: procedurally, it shifts
the burden of justifying the exit payment to the settling pat-
entee, and substantively, it caps the permissible amount of the
exit payment at the patentee's expected future litigation costs.
Although the authors characterize their proposed test as
reflecting antitrust's post-Chicago revolution "preference for ac-
curacy over ease,"6 I submit that it does the opposite by arbi-
Langenfeld & Wenqing Li, Intellectual Property and Agreements to Settle Pat-
ent Disputes: The Case of Settlement Agreements with Payments from Branded
to Generic Drug Manufacturers, 70 ANTITRUST L.J. 777 (2003); Jonathan M.
Lave, Responding to Patent Litigation Settlements: Does the FTC Have It Right
Yet?, 64 U. PITT. L. REV. 201 (2002); Carl Shapiro, Antitrust Limits to Patent
Settlements, 34 RAND J. ECON. 391 (2003); see also Crane, supra note 1, at 750
n.12 (noting the extensive commentary on antitrust issues in patent dispute
settlements).
3. Both houses of Congress have considered versions of the Drug Compe-
tition Act of 2003, which requires generic and branded pharmaceutical compa-
nies entering into settlements of patent infringement lawsuits to file a notifi-
cation with the Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Justice
within ten days of the settlement. See Drug Competition Act of 2003, S. 946,
108th Cong. §§ 1, 5, 6 (2003); Prescription Drug and Medicare Improvement
Act of 2003 (Engrossed Amendment as Agreed to by Senate), H.R. 1, 108th
Cong. Title IX, §§ 901, 905, 906 (2003) (identifying Title IX as the House ver-
sion of the Drug Competition Act of 2003); see also Promoting Availability of
Lower Cost Generic Drugs: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
108th Cong. (2003) (statement of the Honorable Timothy J. Muris, Chairman,
Federal Trade Commission), at 2003 WL 21784991.
4. See Crane, supra note 1, at 779-82.
5. Hovenkamp et al., supra note 2, at 1759.
6. Id. at 1766.
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trarily capping the amount of settlement payments due to an
erroneous focus on the directional flow of plaintiff-to-defendant
settlement payments. As Thomas Cotter argued in his paper in
the same Symposium,7 the authors' test would exclude a range
of potentially socially desirable settlements and force patent in-
fringement litigants into protracted, and socially costly, litiga-
tion.
I. WHY FIXATE ON THE DIRECTIONAL FLOW
OF THE SETTLEMENT PAYMENT?
Hovenkamp, Janis, and Lemley consider payments from
patentee-plaintiffs to allegedly infringing defendants "inher-
ently anticompetitive" because the amount the patentee is will-
ing to pay is inversely correlated to the ex ante likelihood that
the patentee will prevail on its infringement claim if the case
goes to trial." Exactly the same could be said of the plaintiffs
incentives in any case involving a settlement providing for the
defendant's exit from the relevant market, whether or not cash
payment happens to flow from the plaintiff to the defendant. It
makes no sense to single out exclusion payments for disfavor
when the same potential for collusion arises in any settlement
involving the defendant's exit.
For example, if the period of past infringement substan-
tially exceeds the expected future useful life of the patent, a
settlement may involve a payment from the defendant to the
plaintiff together with an agreement to discontinue the alleg-
edly infringing use, even though the patentee's infringement
claim is relatively weak. The defendant's promise to exit the
market may not bring enough in present value monopoly prof-
its to cover the patentee's expected damages recovery from the
period of past infringement, so the defendant has to make some
cash payment in addition to its exit promise to settle the law-
suit.9 Similarly, the parties may agree to a "walk-away" settle-
7. Cotter, supra note 2, at 1802-15.
8. Hovenkamp et al., supra note 2, at 1759.
9. See Crane, supra note 1, at 775. For example, assume the defendant's
past period of infringement caused the patentee to lose $1000 in profits, the
defendant's exit from the market would bring the patentee $500 in future prof-
its, and the patentee has a fifty percent chance of winning the case. Putting
aside any cost savings from settling, the patentee expects to gain $750 from
continuing its suit. The patentee will not accept a settlement in which the de-
fendant merely agrees to discontinue the allegedly infringing use in the fu-
ture. It will require a payment from the defendant of at least $250. The set-
tlement will look "normal" (the defendant pays the plaintiff) even though a
700 [Vol 88:698
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ment where the defendant discontinues the challenged use and
the patentee forgoes its claim for damages. 10 No money ex-
changes hands, but by forgoing the damages claim the patentee
has just as certainly bought out the possibility that it will not
prevail at trial as if it paid the defendant in cash.
Often, a case will involve both claims and counterclaims for
infringement of a series of different patents, or counts in addi-
tion to patent infringement. For example, if the plaintiff has a
patent infringement claim worth $1000 in future monopoly
profits, a breach of contract claim worth $2000 in past dam-
ages, and a fifty percent chance of prevailing on each claim, it
would be willing to settle the case for a payment from the de-
fendant of $500 plus a stipulated injunction against future "in-
fringement" of the patent. Settlement of such mixed cases not
involving the simple model of a patentee suing a defendant on a
single patent and paying the defendant to exit the market in-
volves the same "evil" with which Hovenkamp, Janis, and Lem-
ley are concerned: the exchange of consideration for the defen-
dant's exit from the market without an adjudication that the
patent claim is good." The authors' test, however, would not
make such settlements presumptively illegal and subject to a
cap on the settlement payment amount because the patent
piece is embedded in a larger, aggregate settlement and the
cash payment flows from the defendant to the plaintiff as ordi-
narily happens in settlements involving only a claim for past
damages. 2
portion of the consideration is the monopoly profits the patentee will reap once
the defendant exits, just as in the sort of cases with which the authors are con-
cerned.
10. For example, if the patentee has a damages claim with a present ex-
pected value of $1000 and its expected value from the defendant's exit from
the market is also $1000, the patentee would be willing to forgo its damages
claim in exchange for the defendant's exit from the market.
11. Hovenkamp et al., supra note 2, at 1759.
12. The authors recognize that patent infringement settlements involving
a defendant's cessation of the challenged use without a "substantial exclusion
payment" may still raise concerns, but would allow such a settlement if a
"not... particularly searching" inquiry concluded the settlement was not a
"sham." Id. at 1760. If by "sham" the authors mean a settlement in which the
parties are aware that the patentee will not prevail at trial but purposefully
use the lawsuit as a cover for a market division agreement, then the category
of settlements not involving "exclusion payments" that the authors would find
problematic is very narrow. For example, a case in which the patentee thinks
it has a forty percent chance of winning at trial probably does not count as a
"sham," but the social costs of allowing the defendant to exit the market in
consideration of settling with the plaintiff (whatever the currency of settle-
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Where a settlement agreement involves a party's promise
to exit a market absent any adjudication that the party is le-
gally required to exit, the currency of the settlement (cash
payment, forgoing a past claim for damages, forgoing a differ-
ent legal claim, or some other agreement) is generally unimpor-
tant. The social cost of settlements involving the defendant's
exit from the market derives solely from the fact that the de-
fendant might not have had to exit if it had won the patent
suit. If, ex ante, there is a ten percent chance that the defen-
dant will prevail in the patent suit and the deadweight losses
caused by the absence of competition in the market would be
$1000, the cost of the defendant's exit is $100 (putting aside the
offsetting social benefits of settlements). The flow of the finan-
cial payments in the settlement does not cause that social cost
to increase or decrease. At most, the structure of the settlement
may provide some evidence of the parties' own valuation of the
strength of the lawsuit, although relying on directional flow to
determine ex ante predictions about the probable outcome of
the lawsuit would be difficult or impossible in many cases.
13
Standing alone, the directional flow of the settlement payment
is a poor proxy for determining the ex ante likelihood that the
plaintiff would prevail at trial and legally exclude the defen-
dant.
Settlements involving a cessation of some competitive ac-
tivity by the defendant are not unique to patent litigation.
Similar issues could arise in litigation over covenants not to
compete, territorially limited franchises, trademarks, tortious
interference with contracts, or various kinds of unfair competi-
tion or misrepresentation claims. In many such cases, the liti-
gants may have incentives to divide markets and split monop-
oly rents under the guise of settling a legal dispute, and these
incentives should be of concern to the courts and law enforce-
ment agencies. But use of the direction in which settlement
payment flows to determine which settlements raise concern
will lead to an unduly high number of false positives and false
negatives.
ment) exceed the social gains of allowing the settlement.
13. See Crane, supra note 1, at 790.
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II. WHY CAP THE SETTLEMENT PAYMENT
AT THE PATENTEE'S EXPECTED
OUT-OF-POCKET LITIGATION COSTS?
Hovenkamp, Janis, and Lemley would make per se illegal
any settlement payment from a patentee to an alleged infringer
that exceeded the "expected value of litigation and collateral
costs attending the lawsuit." 4 Their proposed rule is based on
the view that any settlement payment from a patentee to a de-
fendant consists of two elements of value to the patentee: (1)
"the cost of continued litigation" and (2) "the value of eliminat-
ing competition that the patentee could not expect ex ante to
exclude after trial."" Since the elimination of competition ele-
ment is illegitimate from an antitrust perspective, the authors
subtract it from the equation, thereby deriving the "cost of con-
tinued litigation" cap on the amount of any "exclusion pay-
ment."16
The soundness of the authors' analysis of the economic
value of "exclusion payments" to patentees depends largely on
the definition of "cost of continued litigation."" Taking the
broadest definition, their observation might be substantially
true. But the authors take a narrow view of cost and would
limit their proposed cap to "out-of-pocket costs and attorney's
fees,18 essentially the costs that are recoverable under ordinary
fee-shifting regimes.
This standard falls far short of accounting for the many
costs of litigation that firm managers consider in deciding
whether to settle. Fee-shifting statutes, which the authors' pro-
posed rule essentially tracks in categorizing relevant costs, do
not permit recovery of all of the costs firms incur when they
litigate.'9 Patent managers understand that their costs of liti-
gating far exceed their direct out-of-pocket expenses. 20 Firm
employees often spend as much time as their lawyers preparing
the case, producing documents, working with lawyers on litiga-
tion strategy, being deposed, traveling for lawsuit-related
14. Hovenkamp et al., supra note 2, at 1759.
15. Id. at 1758.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 1760 n.177.
19. E.g., Janet Cooper Alexander, The Value of Bad News in Securities
Class Actions, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1421, 1439 (1994).
20. ANTHONY L. MIELE, PATENT STRATEGY: THE MANAGER'S GUIDE TO
PROFITING FROM PATENT PORTFOLIOS 17-18 (2000).
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events, testifying at trial, and observing legal proceedings. Liti-
gation may require deposing or seeking documents from suppli-
ers or customers or engaging in other public conduct that may
embarrass the litigants or damage relationships with third par-
ties.2' Broad discovery rules require the production of docu-
ments and sensitive competitive information for which protec-
tive orders fail to provide adequate assurance of
confidentiality.22 The length of patent litigation may itself im-
pose costs on the patentee by making marketing, research and
development, and other business planning difficult while the
outcome of the case remains uncertain.
These and other indirect costs of continuing to litigate may
explain patentees' eagerness to settle infringement lawsuits for
payments to the defendants in excess of their expected out-of-
pocket litigation costs, even when the patentees have a strong
ex ante likelihood of ultimately succeeding in the lawsuit.
Unlike direct litigation costs, these expected indirect costs are
probably too difficult to quantify to form the basis of the sort of
rule that Hovenkamp, Janis, and Lemley propose. That is not a
ground for excluding them from the calculus, but for not impos-
ing a cost-based cap on the settlement amount at all.
In addition to these indirect costs of litigation, patentees
may choose to settle because of risk aversion,24 which itself
could be called a "cost" of continued litigation. Similarly, if the
firm's shares are publicly traded, the firm may have invested
considerable sums in research and development to obtain the
patent with assurances to shareholders of a profitable return
on the investment. An unexpected loss of the patent lawsuit
may cause management to lose credibility with shareholders
and lead to a greater decline in the value of the company's
shares than the lost net present value of future monopoly prof-
its from winning the patent case.25 Settling allows management
21. E.g., Tate Access Floors, Inc. v. Interface Architectural Res., Inc., 185
F. Supp. 2d 588, 604 (D. Md. 2002) (noting that the defendant used the testi-
mony of customers in attempting to show the invalidity of the patent due to
obviousness).
22. See Crane, supra note 1, at 758-59 (explaining that patent litigation
often requires sharing of sensitive competitive information in discovery and
that protective orders limiting access to such documents to attorneys involved
in the case are "difficult to enforce").
23. See infra notes 28-30 and accompanying text (illustrating this prob-
lem).
24. Cotter, supra note 2, at 1806-07.
25. See, e.g., Lawrence Ingrassia, Polaroid Falls 22% on Negative News,
704 [Vol 88:698
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to eliminate the possibility of unexpected bad news that might
have wider ripple effects for the firm.
In sum, patentees look to settle patent infringement law-
suits for a variety of reasons, including out-of-pocket litigation
costs, unrelated to "the value of eliminating competition that
the patentee could not expect ex ante to exclude after trial."
26
The authors' rule would disregard these costs and impose an
unduly restrictive cap on patent infringement settlements.
III. THE SOCIAL COSTS OF LIMITING PATENT
SETTLEMENTS AND THE LIMITED RELEVANCE
OF A LICENSING ALTERNATIVE
Hovenkamp, Janis, and Lemley approach patent settle-
ments involving exit or nonentry by the defendant from the
perspective of avoiding deadweight social losses that occur
when monopolists reduce output in order to increase price. If
ex ante there is a twenty percent chance that the patentee will
lose an infringement case in which victory would bring a dead-
weight loss of $1000 to society, the social cost of permitting a
settlement in which the defendant exits the market is $200-
from the antitrust perspective. But there is another side to the
story to which the authors devote few comments: the effects on
the incentive-reward system of the patent laws of curtailing
patentees' control over the process of legally vindicating their
patent rights. By severely limiting patent settlements, the au-
thors' rule would undermine a major goal of patent law, that of
encouraging investment in innovation.1
The potential social costs of the authors' rule are many.
Most obviously, if the rule results in prolonged litigation it will
impose on the patentee the costs identified in the previous sec-
tion, which reduce the value of the patent and therefore the in-
WALL ST. J., Oct. 16, 1990, at C1 (reporting that Polaroid's stock price fell
twenty-two percent in reaction to a lower-than-expected damage award in its
patent infringement lawsuit against Kodak). Empirical research shows that
shareholders punish management more for unexpected bad news than they
reward management for unexpected good news. Werner F.M. De Bondt &
Richard H. Thaler, Further Evidence on Investor Overreaction and Stock Mar-
ket Seasonality, 42 J. FIN. 557, 557-58, 577-79 (1987); Werner F.M. De Bondt
& Richard H. Thaler, Does the Stock Market Overreact?, 40 J. FIN. 793, 799
(1985).
26. Hovenkamp et al., supra note 2, at 1758.
27. See infra notes 28-30 and accompanying text (discussing this disin-
centive).
2004]
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centive to engage in inventive activity. Or the patentee may
be able to pass along the costs to its customers, who will then
bear the brunt of the settlement restriction. Prolonged litiga-
tion may also freeze inventive activity for years because of the
uncertainty over whether the alleged infringer will be allowed
to participate in the market with its current technology or will
be required to invent around the patent and to find an alterna-
tive, noninfringing way of entering. Because the expected dam-
ages award consists of the patentee's monopoly profits, in-
fringement defendants have an incentive to stay off the market
during the period of the lawsuit because their expected losses
from making sales exceed their expected gains (unless the pat-
entee's case is very weak).29 The defendant can only gain mar-
ket share at a competitive price if it sells the allegedly infring-
ing product during the course of the litigation. An early
settlement eliminates the uncertainty over the scope and valid-
ity of the patent and may lead the defendant to invent around
the patent earlier than if it had awaited the outcome of the
patent lawsuit.0
The authors' rule would also have undesirable effects on
new firms' incentives to attempt entry. As Jerry Hausman has
shown, a rule restricting patent settlements will have the effect
of increasing the anticipated costs of litigation for any firm con-
sidering entering a patent-intensive market.3 ' Patent settle-
ments thus have the procompetitive effect of reducing barriers
to entry.32 Conversely, restricting patent settlements increases
barriers to entry by increasing litigation costs that are often
necessary for entry.3 3
28. Cotter, supra note 2, at 1809-10.
29. See, e.g., Bayer AG v. Elan Pharm. Research Corp., 212 F.3d 1241,
1247 n.5 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (noting that a generic pharmaceutical manufacturer
chose to delay marketing its drug until resolution of a branded firm's in-
fringement lawsuit).
30. Crane, supra note 1, at 764.
31. In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 261 F. Supp. 2d
188, 256-57 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) (quoting the expert declaration of Jerry Hausman
for the proposition that "'[tihe ability to settle a patent challenge on flexible
terms can have a pro-competitive effect because it increases the number of
patent challenges by decreasing barriers to entry.'").
32. Id.
33. Hovenkamp, Janis, and Lemley call this argument "perverse" because
"in the pharmaceutical industry the settlement in question, an exclusion pay-
ment, prevents entry altogether, not just by the settling firm, but by any other
generic as well" due to a loophole in the Hatch-Waxman Act. Herbert Hovenk-
amp, et al., Balancing Ease and Accuracy in Assessing Pharmaceutical Exclu-
706 [Vol 88:698
2004] ASSESSING PATENT SETTLEMENTS
Hovenkamp, Janis, and Lemley do not believe that their
proposed rule would "necessarily impede settlement[s]," be-
cause the parties can always agree to settle through a license
arrangement which enables "more competition while allowing
the parties to avoid the costs of uncertainty."3 4 Two brief re-
sponses are warranted.
First, a licensing agreement does not necessarily ensure
competition, and virtually ensures that the defendant's price to
customers will exceed the price it would have charged if it had
simply marketed the product without having to pay a royalty to
the patentee. A license may also give the patentee control over
the alleged infringer's price, quantity, or sales territory.35 As
Hovenkamp explains in his antitrust treatise, "firms cartelizing
a market may agree to use a licensing agreement to give effect
to a territorial division scheme, with the agreement covering a
patent of dubious validity."36 A settlement involving a licensing
agreement prior to any adjudication that the patent rights li-
censed are in fact enforceable poses many of the same risks of
monopolistic behavior by the licensor and licensee as "exclusion
payments." The defendant, who previously asserted that it had
the right to compete without permission of the patentee, now
agrees that it must pay the patentee for the right to compete
and to accept those conditions on its competitive behavior that
the patentee chooses to impose. Indeed, some settlements in
sion Payments, 88 MINN. L. REV. 712, 716-17 (2004). As I have noted else-
where, the concerns created by the 180-day generic exclusivity rule to which
the authors are referring can be resolved by requiring the settling generic to
waive its statutory claim to exclusivity if it settles a patent infringement law-
suit. See Crane, supra note 1, at 795-96.
34. Hovenkamp et al., supra note 2, at 1760-61.
35. HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF
COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE § 5.5cl (2d ed. 1999).
36. Id. § 5.5c2.
37. The authors' assertion that "licensing is generally a procompetitive
practice," Hovenkamp et al., supra note 33, at 717, may be overbroad as ap-
plied to licensing agreements in the settlement of patent lawsuits. Courts and
the antitrust enforcement agencies generally favor licensing of intellectual
property because they assume that the licensee would have been unable to use
the intellectual property absent the license. When the licensee and licensor
would have been competitors absent the licensing arrangement, antitrust con-
cerns arise. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, ANTITRUST
GUIDELINES FOR THE LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY § 3.1, 7 (1995)
(stating that "antitrust concerns may arise when a licensing arrangement
harms competition among entities that would have been actual or likely poten-
tial competitors in a relevant market in the absence of the license (entities in a
'horizontal relationship')"). In a patent infringement lawsuit between branded
and generic pharmaceuticals, the generic is claiming that it is entitled to be
707
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which the defendant accepts a payment from the plaintiff to
discontinue the allegedly infringing use may be preferable to
licensing settlements because the defendant may thereafter in-
vent around the patent and enter the market in unfettered
competition with the patentee, but without infringing the pat-
ent.38
Second, firms may be reluctant to license their patents be-
cause the licensee may free ride on the patentee's promotional
efforts or dilute the value of the patent through poor production
or marketing of the patented product.39 Hovenkamp, Janis, and
Lemley acknowledge this limitation on the licensing option (al-
though they believe it to be rare), but dismiss it as an argument
for permitting exclusion payments because the patentee is free
to not settle at all.4" That observation, however, only questions
whether we are better off with a blanket rule against exclusion
payments that exceed expected out-of-pocket litigation costs or
with a rule that acknowledges that these settlements may be
socially optimal when the patentee has a strong chance of suc-
ceeding in its patent infringement claim. If settlements involv-
ing a defendant's cessation of the allegedly infringing use in ex-
change for a payment from the patentee exceeding the
patentee's expected out-of-pocket litigation expenses are some-
times socially preferable to continued litigation, the hypotheti-
cal possibility of an alternative licensing solution does not sup-
port adoption of the authors' per se rule.
the branded firm's competitor without a license. When the generic drops that
assertion and accepts a license prior to adjudication of its defense, the same
concerns arise as when the generic agrees to exit the market as part of a set-
tlement.
It is not difficult to imagine how a patentee with a weak infringement
claim could assure the continuity of its monopoly profits by settling through a
licensing arrangement. For example, the patentee could assign the licensee an
exclusive sales territory and collect a royalty even while it continued to collect
monopoly rents in its own sales territory. In the licensing context, just as in
the "exclusion payments" context, the ex ante strength of the infringement
claim, not the form of the settlement, should drive the antitrust assessment.
38. See Crane, supra note 1, at 768-69. The settling patentee may try to
prevent the defendant from inventing around the patent by broadening the
scope of the settlement agreement to include activities not covered by the pat-
ent's claims. Id. at 769. However, Hovenkamp, Janis, Lemley, and I agree that
any such overbroad settlement would be illegal. Compare Hovenkamp et al.,
supra note 2, at 1764-65, with Crane, supra note 1, at 792-96.
39. Crane, supra note 1, at 767-68.
40. Hovenkamp et al., supra note 2, at 1761 n.180.
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IV. WHOSE BURDEN IS IT?
While my principal objection to Hovenkamp, Janis, and
Lemley's proposed rule relates to their proposed cap on "exclu-
sion settlement" payments, I also differ with their view that all
payments from a patentee to an alleged infringer should be
presumptively illegal, subject to the defendant's right to rebut
the presumption of illegality under defined circumstances.4'
While it may be sensible to require the settling parties to
document the strength of the patentee's infringement claim,
placing the burden of persuasion on the settling parties would
unduly chill patent infringement settlements.
On a practical level, the allocation of the burden of produc-
tion may be relatively unimportant. The determining factor in
whether to approve or to disapprove patent settlements involv-
ing the defendant's exit or nonentry should be the ex ante like-
lihood that the defendant would be excluded from the market if
the case was finally adjudicated. The settling parties typically
will have the most information on that topic and will, therefore,
be in the best position to produce information justifying the set-
tlement. 2 Wherever the burden is technically placed, the set-
tling parties' own information usually will become the fulcrum
of the antitrust analysis, and there is relatively little social cost
in requiring the settling parties to retain documents going to
the core issues in the patent infringement lawsuit. Placing the
burden of persuasion on the settling parties, however, would
chill patent infringement settlements by making them pre-
sumptively illegal under section 1 of the Sherman Act.43 One
does not envy the patentee's general counsel who has to inform
senior management that by settling a patent infringement law-
suit they will presumptively become criminals and subject to
fines and imprisonment unless they can persuade a jury that
they likely would have won the patent infringement lawsuit
anyway. Such a rule would also encourage unfounded treble
damages lawsuits against the settling parties, since consumers
could sue simply by alleging that a settlement involving an ex-
clusion payment occurred, regardless of the strength of the pat-
entee's infringement suit. From the perspective of the outside
41. Id. at 1759.
42. See generally Bruce L. Hay & Kathryn E. Spier, Burdens of Proof in
Civil Litigation: An Economic Perspective, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 413, 419 (1997)
("Other things being equal, the lower one party's relative costs, the stronger
the argument for giving him the burden of proof.").
43. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
2004]
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observer, Hovenkamp, Janis, and Lemley's proposed rule sends
the message that patent settlements involving exit payments
are inherently suspect, even though many such settlements are
socially desirable.
Pending legislation may partially rationalize the burden
question in the pharmaceutical industry, the locus of the recent
controversy over patent settlements. The Drug Competition
Act44 will require the settling parties to notify the antitrust en-
forcement agencies of most patent infringement settlements
within ten days, giving the agencies an opportunity to investi-
gate and to shape the settlements through injunctive litigation
(or the threat of litigation). As a practical matter, government
involvement in pharmaceutical patent settlements may come to
resemble Hart-Scott-Rodino merger review,45 where the burden
of proving the merger anticompetitive lies with the government
but practically shifts to the merging parties seeking to avoid
the cost, embarrassment, and delay of a government lawsuit.
4 6
Requiring the settling parties to justify their settlement in dis-
cussions with the government at the time of the settlement is
reasonable, but presumptively exposing them to criminal liabil-
ity and treble damages suits is not.
CONCLUSION
Crafting a simple legal rule makes sense when its applica-
tion is likely to reach the optimal result most of the time and
the costs of applying a more complicated rule would exceed its
benefits. The per se rule proposed by Hovenkamp, Janis, and
Lemley meets the test of simplicity, but not the test of general
accuracy. By focusing the attention of courts and antitrust
regulators on the direction in which settlement payments flow,
the per se rule diverts attention from the fact that the strength
of the patent infringement suit, not the monetary structure of
the settlement, determines whether the settlement is socially
44. See supra note 3 (discussing the Drug Competition Act of 2003).
45. See 15 U.S.C. § 15c (2000).
46. The Drug Competition Act does not give the government one of its
most powerful tools under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act: the ability to hold up the
merger pending satisfaction of a Second Request. See Ashutosh Bhagwat,
Modes of Regulatory Enforcement and the Problem of Administrative Discre-
tion, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 1275, 1292-93 (1999) (discussing the Hart-Scott-Rodino
Act's influence over the application of antitrust law to corporate mergers).
47. See generally Richard A. Epstein, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX
WORLD (1995) (proposing a return to simple rules in different substantive ar-
eas of law).
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beneficial or costly. By capping patent settlements involving a
plaintiff-to-defendant payment at the plaintiffs expected out-
of-pocket legal expenses, the rule would make per se illegal
many socially beneficial settlements. If a court or antitrust en-
forcement agency concludes that the patentee's claim is likely
to succeed, then placing restrictions on the direction in which
payment can flow in the settlement or capping the amount of
the settlement at the patentee's expected out-of-pocket litiga-
tion expenses is unwarranted.
